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Post-colonial nations experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions that foster a unique duo of ideologies. These are the ideology of Historical 
Recognition versus Negation (or HRN) and the ideology of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). These ideologies operate in tandem to legitimize 
material and symbolic inequality in response to specific and contested aspects of post-colonial social structure and history. HRN is promoted by the 
dominant group to legitimize inequality in outcomes experienced by Indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies where historical injustice is objective 
fact (objective historical injustice). SPE is promoted by the dominant group to claim ownership of the national category in post-colonial societies where 
there is an inability to logically deny that Indigenous peoples “belong” to the nation (undeniable belongingness). I present the Post-Colonial Ideology 
Scale (PCIS-2D), which assesses these two distinct “dark” ideologies. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses validated the factor structure of the 
PCIS-2D in undergraduate (N = 373; Study 1) and community (N = 447; Study 2) samples of New Zealand (NZ) citizens. The PCIS-2D evidenced good 
construct validity, as SPE and HRN predicted unique variance in voting preferences and social policy attitudes controlling for demographics, Big Five 
personality, and System Justification ideology (Study 2). These results indicate that HRN and SPE are distinct ideologies that explain unique variance in 
support for a range of social and political issues. At the systemic level, HRN and SPE form a joint ideological system that legitimates inequality in two 
critical social domains: one relating to resource allocations, the other relating to representation and ownership of the national category.
The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology:  
A Model of Symbolic Exclusion and Historical Negation
Chris G. Sibley, Department of Psychology, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Integration, as stated, implies some continuation of Maori cul-
ture. Much of it, though, has already departed and only the fit-
test elements (worthiest of preservation) have survived the onset 
of civilisation. Language, arts and crafts, and the institutions of 
the marae are the chief relics. Only the Maori’s [sic] themselves 
can decide whether these features of their ancient life are, in 
fact, to be kept alive; and, in the final analysis, it is entirely a 
matter of individual choice. 
Excerpt from the Hunn Report, commissioned by the New 
Zealand Government in 1961 (p. 15).
Let me be quite clear. Many things happened to the Maori 
people that should not have happened. There were injustices, 
and the Treaty process is an attempt to acknowledge that, and 
to make a gesture at recompense. But it is only that. It can be no 
more than that. None of us was around at the time of the New 
Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confisca-
tions. There is a limit to how much any generation can apologise 
for the sins of its great grandparents. 
(Excerpt from speech on Nationhood delivered by National 
Party leader Don Brash, 27 January 2004).
Ideology matters; it has power. Let me be quite clear what 
I mean by this; power in the sense that ideologies are 
persuasive on a broad societal level. Ideology can be used 
to sway opinion and alter the way in which people think 
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about or view social issues within a particular frame of 
reference. A successful ideology achieves this power by 
providing a standard rhetoric or discourse that permeates 
or is consensually endorsed by a wide section of society. 
Ideologies therefore exert social control to the extent that 
they shape public opinion in a direction intended by elites; 
be it opinions about a group or social issue, or political or 
voting preferences. The psychological study of ideology has 
been something of a dead area for the last few decades, and 
has only been recently reinvigorated by researchers such as 
Jost (2006), Sidanius, and Pratto (1999), and Jackman (1994). 
Jost’s review (2006) was particularly influential in this 
regard, and provided a direct response to claims that ideol-
ogy was irrelevant for understanding the voting behavior of 
ordinary citizens.
In this paper, I propose a model of ideology specific to post-
colonial nations where “former colonizers” live side by side 
with “former colonized” peoples. I argue that the history 
of injustice experienced by Indigenous peoples in many 
post-colonial nations, paired with a tension in recognizing 
Indigenous culture as a fundamental or inherent aspect of 
the nation, has resulted in two distinct ideologies that are 
central to many aspects of post-colonial intergroup rela-
tions. The epigraphs with which I began this manuscript 
provide good examples of these two distinct ideologies in 
the New Zealand (NZ) context. The first quote, by Hunn 
in 1961, relates to the role and fitness of Indigenous culture, 
symbols, and practices. The second quote, by Brash in 2004, 
is a recent example of political discourse negating the con-
temporary relevance of historical injustices experienced by 
Māori, the Indigenous peoples of New Zealand.
I present a new measure, the Post-Colonial Ideology 
Scale – 2 Dimensions (or PCIS-2D) that indexes these dual 
“dark” ideologies, which I label Symbolic Projection versus 
Exclusion (SPE) and Historical Recognition versus Negation 
(HRN). I define SPE as a measure assessing the prescriptive 
belief that Indigenous culture is irrelevant in representa-
tions of modern national identity [exclusion], versus the 
belief that markers and symbols of Indigenous culture pro-
vide a meaningful addition to representations of national 
identity and the national category [projection]. I define 
HRN as a measure of the prescriptive belief that historical 
injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples in the colonial 
era are irrelevant in contemporary society [negation], versus 
the belief that such injustices are of continued relevance 
and that current generations of settler/colonial members of 
the population have an obligation to address such injustices 
[recognition].
I argue that SPE and HRN are distinct and independently 
coherent ideologies that arise from different social-struc-
tural factors of post-colonial society. As I argue below, these 
two distinct ideologies will often co-occur because in post-
colonial societies, the Indigenous peoples have experienced 
objective historical injustice (which should produce HRN 
as a response) and have a claim of undeniable national-
ity (which should produce SPE as a response). I argue that 
these two ideologies operate additively to target dual central 
aspects of intergroup relations, and articulate a pair of 
discourses that draw upon culturally sanctioned repertoires 
to “make ok” or dismiss calls for reparation and representa-
tion. SPE and HRN therefore constitute distinct ideologies, 
as defined by Rokeach (1968, 123–24), who argued that “an 
ideology is an organization of beliefs and attitudes—reli-
gious, political, or philosophical in nature—that is more 
or less institutionalized or shared with others, deriving 
from external authority”. I evaluate the proposed Dark Duo 
Model of Post-Colonial Ideology by first assessing the psy-
chometric properties of the PCIS-2D in the NZ context. I 
then extend this analysis to demonstrate that SPE and HRN 
predict substantial unique variance in political voting pref-
erences and social policy attitudes in NZ after controlling 
for plausible alternative explanatory variables (demograph-
ics, personality, and System Justification ideology).
1. A Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology
Ideologies are not plucked from thin air; their content is 
dependent upon specific social conditions. Ideologies will 
therefore differ across cultures and groups to the extent 
that social conditions differ. Put simply, socio-structural 
conditions provide a more fertile environment for some 
ideologies than others; and once an ideology takes root, it 
reciprocally influences socio-structural conditions by shap-
ing the way in which people view existing arrangements, 
and the political and social policies that they will or will not 
support.
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Perhaps the most widely-researched example of the socio-
structural geneses of ideology is Glick and Fiske’s Ambiva-
lent Sexism Theory (1996), which states that socio-structural 
relations between men and women have produced, and in 
turn legitimize and maintain, two related forms of sexism: 
Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism. The duality of sexist 
ideology is theorized to result from mutual interdependen-
cies between men and women, such as the need for hetero-
sexual intimacy, paired with continued gender inequality 
(Glick and Fiske 1996). This promotes a pair of ideologies 
that prescribe that women should be both protected and 
controlled by men, while at the same time stating that 
women should be vilified if they fail to conform to tradi-
tional gender roles. Ethnic group relations, in contrast, are 
not characterized by dyadic needs in the same way, and 
thus ideologies relating to race relations often differ dramat-
ically from those relating to gender relations as they do not 
emphasize to the same extent this ideological component 
positioning subordinate or disadvantaged group members 
as wonderful but weak (e.g., a woman as her male partner’s 
“better half”). Ethnic group ideologies (of which racism 
is a good example), in contrast, tend, in most contexts, to 
be focused more directly on hostile or antipathetic beliefs 
(Jackman 1994).
Post-colonial nations, I argue, experience a specific set of 
socio-structural conditions between Indigenous and more 
recent settler/immigrant populations that differ in impor-
tant regards from ethnic group relations in other nations. 
This results from a unique history in which historical 
injustices are in many cases undeniable, paired with the 
inability of the dominant (former settler) group to logically 
deny that Indigenous peoples “belong” to the nation. In 
contrast, ideologies expressing sentiments along the lines of 
“they should go back to their own countries as they are not 
wanted here” seem to be a common aspect of contemporary 
prejudice toward many recent non-Indigenous immigrant 
groups (e.g., Asian peoples in the United States, Turkish 
people in Germany).
The dual socio-structural conditions of objective historical 
injustice and undeniable nationality result in a tension that I 
argue permeates many mainstream contemporary post-co-
lonial societies. The presence of objective historical injustice 
and undeniable nationality engender as a response distinct 
ideologies prescribing opposition versus support for (a) the 
relevance of historical injustices experienced by Indigenous 
peoples for contemporary post-colonial society and (b) the 
symbolic projection of Indigenous symbols in representa-
tions of the national category. I discuss each of these ideolo-
gies in turn in the following two sections.
1.1. Historical Injustice and the Ideology of Historical Negation
History—or at least consensually shared representations of 
history—tend to favor majority or dominant groups. NZ, 
where the current research was conducted, like many other 
post-colonial nations, can trace a history of considerable 
injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples. Like minor-
ity ethnic groups in many nations, the Indigenous peoples 
of NZ (Māori) also remain disadvantaged relative to the 
dominant majority group (NZ Europeans) in contemporary 
society. Māori, for example, earn on average two New Zea-
land dollars less per hour than NZ Europeans, and their life 
expectancy is 8.2 years lower (The Social Report 2006). One 
might reasonably argue, as many have (Belich 1996), that 
present day inequalities between Māori and NZ Europeans 
are at least partially the product of historical injustices expe-
rienced by Māori during the colonial period; injustices such 
as the alienation of communally owned land from Māori, 
and bans on the use of Māori language in schools. Despite 
this, claims for reparation on the basis of historical injus-
tice often incite considerable controversy and opposition in 
mainstream (NZ European) society (Sibley et al. 2008).
Liu and colleagues argue that the positioning of history 
constitutes a powerful ideology for mobilizing opinions 
about resource allocations for historically disadvantaged 
groups in contemporary post-colonial society (Liu and Hil-
ton 2005; Liu and Sibley 2009). In this regard, the negation 
of historical injustices can be seen to reflect a political ideol-
ogy of considerable power. More generally, Liu and Hilton 
argue that history provides a charter, or central and binding 
ideology, for the ingroup and nation that provides “an ac-
count of its origin and historical mission. . . . Such charters 
are constitutional: they serve the function of a foundational 
myth for a society, defining rights and obligations for a 
group and legitimizing its social and political arrange-
ments” (2005, 538). The manner in which historical charters 
110IJCV : Vol. 4 (1) 2010, pp. 106 – 123Chris G. Sibley: The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology
are constructed and interpreted can have enduring implica-
tions for what is considered fair in society, whether specific 
historical events constitute injustices, and how resources are 
to be allocated in contemporary society.
In an initial examination of this position, Sibley et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that HRN was a critical mediator of policy 
preferences on issues impacting Māori, and indeed ex-
plained around 60 percent of the variance in resource-spe-
cific policy preferences among NZ Europeans. Sibley and Liu 
(in press) argue that HRN is partially produced by the moti-
vation to protect the glorious history of the ingroup (and the 
related perception of the group’s ancestors as decent hard-
working people who earned what they achieved). Discourses 
positioning the ingroup as being accountable or as having 
a responsibility for the actions of previous generations of 
their group, or as even being directly linked and therefore 
“alike” to the perpetrators of previous historical injustices 
and crimes constitute a dramatic threat to positive repre-
sentations of the dominant ingroup. So long as Indigenous 
peoples have a collective voice and can continue to call the 
majority group to account for historical injustices, I argue 
that an ideology of Historical Negation, as indexed by the 
measure of HRN originally developed by Sibley et al. (2008) 
will likely occur as a result in order to negate such calls.
1.2. Undeniable Nationality and the Ideology of Symbolic Exclusion
Along with the ability to define the relevance of specific 
aspects of history, the ability to define the national category 
is also of central importance for the legitimation of the sta-
tus quo in post-colonial society. Representations of history 
and representations of the nation form two critical building 
blocks for defining who “we” are and where “we” have come 
from.
The importance of definitions of the national category for 
understanding prejudice and discrimination is underlined 
by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) in their Ingroup Projec-
tion Model. The Ingroup Projection Model begins with 
the premise that superordinate categories, by definition, 
include all constituent groups. In the case of the national 
category, this would include all citizens, regardless of their 
specific ethnic group identification. The model states that 
tolerance versus discrimination is in turn predicted by the 
extent to which a group is seen to “fit” or be representative 
of the national or inclusive category. Thus, while all groups 
of citizens are seen to constitute the national category, not 
all groups will be seen as equally representing the values 
and character of the national prototype. Indeed, as predic-
tions derived from System Justification Theory (Jost and 
Banaji 1994) also emphasize, consensual representations of 
the prototypical features of the inclusive category—that is, 
the characteristics that are seen as most typical for defining 
members of the category—should be unduly determined 
by the majority or dominant group within society (see also 
Sidanius and Petrocik 2001). This model is well supported 
by experimental data. Numerous studies indicate that 
groups that are seen as less representative of superordinate 
categories tend to be judged more harshly than groups that 
are seen as fitting the national prototype (e.g., Waldzus et al. 
2003; Wenzel et al. 2003).
Representations of the majority or dominant group as the 
prototypical exemplar of the national category may help 
to promote and maintain hierarchically organized social 
structures, especially when they are consensually shared by 
both majority and minority group members. Under such 
conditions, appeals to national identity and values become 
synonymous with appeals to the identity and values of the 
dominant majority. As Devos and Banaji stress (2005), such 
appeals may therefore function to reduce the opportunity of 
ethnic minority groups to contribute to concepts of national 
identity and nationhood (or in some cases marginalize or 
directly exclude such contributions). Sidanius and Petrocik 
discuss a similar phenomenon which they refer to as exclu-
sionary patriotism (2001). This seems to represent a central 
process in intergroup relations that likely occurs across a 
diverse range of stratification criteria (including ethnicity, 
gender, and age).
I argue that an ideology of exclusion (versus projection) is 
also fundamental to governing intergroup relations in post-
colonial nations. This ideology of SPE is extremely similar 
to prescriptive beliefs relating to the exclusion versus projec-
tion of various groups in the national prototype for say, re-
cent immigrant groups, but must be managed differently in 
post-colonial nations because Indigenous groups have what 
I refer to as undeniable nationality. That is, their status as 
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members of the national or superordinate category cannot 
be questioned in definitional terms. Given that Indigenous 
peoples within a given nation have a collective voice calling 
for cultural representation and recognition as part of the 
nation, I argue that an ideology akin to that I describe here 
in terms of SPE should occur as a result because it provides 
a mechanism for negating the collective voice of the Indig-
enous peoples.
However, as I articulate in Study 2, SPE may vary in mean 
level; and this is perhaps the most troubling aspect of this 
ideology. In short, a low level of SPE (that is, support for 
symbolic projection of Indigenous culture) may, when 
paired with high HRN (the positioning of historical injus-
tice as irrelevant) form a particularly effective and insidious 
method of social control in post-colonial society. This is 
because support for the projection of symbolic and possibly 
tokenistic aspects of Indigenous culture may diffuse disso-
nance, or allow majority group members to legitimate, both 
to themselves and others, expressions of opposition toward 
calls for reparation for historical injustice relating more 
directly to material or resource-based issues.
1.3. Overview and Summary
I present two studies assessing the reliability and validity 
of the PCIS-2D. Study 1 provides an initial test of the fac-
tor structure of the PCIS-2D, and uses Exploratory Factor 
Analysis to examine the proposed scales assessing respec-
tive ideologies of HRN and SPE. Study 2 provides a confir-
matory test of the proposed two-dimensional structure of 
the PCIS-2D using Confirmatory Factor Analysis of a large 
community sample. Study 2 also examines the predictive 
validity of the HRN and SPE scales of the PCIS-2D by test-
ing whether these two distinct ideologies predict unique 
variance in, and thus provide unique explanatory power 
for explaining, specific social policy issues and political 
party attitudes. 
2. Study 1: Development of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants and Procedure
Participants were 372 undergraduates who completed the 
questionnaire in their own time at the end of tutorials (117 
men, 253 women, 2 unreported; Mage= 19.46 SDage = 4.68). 
All participants were NZ citizens (279 Pākehā/European, 31 
Māori, 19 Pacific Nations, 20 Chinese, 11 Indian, 2 Middle 
Eastern, and 10 other/unreported).
2.1.2. Measures
I administered the PCIS-2D (Post-Colonial Ideology Scale 
– 2 Dimensions), which contained balanced eight-item 
scales assessing SPE and HRN. Items were rated from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). See Table 1 for 
the full item list. The scale assessing HRN were originally 
developed by Sibley et al. (2008). As discussed by Sibley et 
al. (2008), the item HRN05, as listed in Table 1, was taken 
from the measure of collective guilt developed by Doosje et 
al. (1998).
2.2. Results
I examined the factor structure of the PCIS-2D using 
Maximum Likelihood Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). 
Comparison of actual and parallel eigenvalues generated 
using the procedure provided by O’Connor (2000) sup-
ported a two-factor model that explained 56 percent of the 
variance. Only the first two eigenvalues (6.86, 2.07, 1.15, 
.73, .68, .66) were greater than those the 95th percentile of 
chance eigenvalues generated from random data with the 
same number of participants and items (1.44, 1.34, 1.28, 1.22, 
1.16, 1.12). This indicates that, as hypothesized, only the first 
two factors explained more variance than could be attrib-
uted to chance.
Item loadings for a two-factor solution, estimated using an 
oblique rotation, are presented in Table 1. I opted to employ 
an oblique rotation as I saw no reason to restrict the model 
by assuming that the two hypothesized factors would be or-
thogonal (that is, uncorrelated). As shown, items assessing 
SPE loaded cleanly on the first factor, and items assessing 
HRN loaded cleanly on the second. The SPE and HRN sub-
scales both evidenced high internal reliability (αs = .86 and 
.90), and were moderately to strongly positively correlated 
(r(370) = .55, p < .01).
2.3. Discussion
Study 1 provided promising support for the factor structure 
and internal reliability of the two distinct but correlated 
dimensions of ideology assessed by the PCIS-2D.
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Table 1: Item content and pattern matrix coefficients from an Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D)
Symbolic Projection vs. Exclusion (SPE) Factor 1 Factor 2
SPE01 I think that Ma–ori culture helps to define New Zealand in positive ways. (r) .72 .08
SPE02
I reckon Ma–ori culture should stay where it belongs—with Ma–ori. 
It doesn’t concern other New Zealanders. 
.73 -.02
SPE03
Ma–ori culture is something that all New Zealanders can share in, 
even if they are not themselves Ma–ori by descent. (r)
.68 .01
SPE04
I reckon New Zealand would be a much better place if it stopped  
trying to promote Ma–ori culture and just got on with other things. 
.85 .02
SPE05
I think Ma–ori culture is just as important as European culture for 
defining what true “New Zealandness” is. (r)
.71 -.05
SPE06
When we’re honest about it, Ma–ori culture has very little to do 
with what it actually means to be a true New Zealander. 
.64 .01
SPE07
New Zealand would be a much more boring place to live  
if it was all just based on White/European culture. (r)
.53 .03
SPE08
New Zealand would be a better place to live if we forgot  
about trying to promote Ma–ori culture to everyone. 
.86 -.03
Historical Recognition vs. Negation (HRN)
HRN01
Grievances for past injustices should be recognized and due compensation  
offered to the descendants of those who suffered from such injustices. (r)
-.05 .84
HRN02 We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors. .01 .60
HRN03
New Zealand law needs to recognize that certain ethnic minorities have been treated unfairly in the 
past. People belonging to those groups should be entitled to certain benefits and compensation. (r)
-.04 .86
HRN04
We should all move on as one nation and forget about past  
differences and conflicts between ethnic groups.
-.05 .49
HRN05
I believe that I should take part in the efforts to help repair the damage  
to others caused by earlier generations of people from my ethnic group. (r)
.15 .74
HRN06
It is true that many things happened to Ma–ori people in the past that should not 
have happened, but it is unfair to hold current generations of NZ Europeans/Pakeha  
accountable for things that happened so long ago.
-.02 .51
HRN07
We as a nation have a responsibility that see that due settlement  
is offered to Ma–ori in compensation for past injustices. (r)
.21 .45
HRN08
People who weren’t around in previous centuries should  
not feel accountable for the actions of their ancestors.
.08 .58
Note. Pattern matrix coefficients > .25 are printed in bold. Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted using Maximum Likelihood Estimation with oblique rotation. N = 374 undergraduates born in 
New Zealand. (r) indicates reverse scored items. For shortened (three-item) versions of these measures, I suggest using items SPE01, SPE02 and SPE08 to assess Symbolic Exclusion, and items 
HRN02, HRN04 and HRN08 to assess Historical Negation. This version of the PCIS refers to the New Zealand context. Items could easily be reworded by simply replacing references to the relevant 
nation and Indigenous group.
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3. Study 2: Validation of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale
I extended my analysis of the factor structure of the PCIS-
2D in Study 2 using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of 
data from a large community sample of NZ citizens. CFA 
is a powerful technique that allows formal tests assess-
ing how well a model (in this case a model of two distinct 
but correlated factors representing SPE and HRN) fits the 
observed data. CFA also allows tests of whether the hypoth-
esized model fits the data significantly better than plausible 
alternatives (in this case a single-factor model in which I 
modeled SPE and HRN as representing a single ideology).
3.1.  Ideology Should Predict Voting  Preferences 
and Social Policy Attitudes
I also evaluated the construct validity (both discriminant 
and convergent) of the PCIS-2D. Discriminant valid-
ity refers to whether the proposed measure or measures 
differ from other measures that might plausibly assess the 
same construct. Convergent validity refers to whether the 
proposed measure or measures are similar to, or predict 
other measures for which we can make strong theoretical 
predictions that they should be related. In order to evaluate 
these properties of the PCIS-2D, I tested whether the SPE 
and HRN subscales predicted unique variance in support 
for the two primary political parties in New Zealand: the 
Labor Party (the primary center-left party) and the National 
Party (the primary center-right party). 
Central to Rokeach’s aforementioned definition of ideol-
ogy (1968) is that it is promoted by political elites to forge 
consensus of opinion among ingroup members. If SPE and 
HRN constitute distinct and meaningful political ideologies 
in the NZ context, then I reasoned that both scales should 
predict unique variance in support for the two primary NZ 
political parties. I also predicted that SPE and HRN would 
explain unique variance in support for another widely 
debated contemporary policy issue in NZ society: that of 
government funding of a full-time free-to-air Māori televi-
sion channel (which is now up and running).
I also examined the incremental validity of SPE and HRN 
by controlling for a range of alternative explanatory vari-
ables in the analysis: demographics, Big Five personality, 
and System Justification. Tests of incremental validity assess 
whether a proposed measure explains novel variance in an 
outcome variable that was previously unexplained by an ex-
isting model (or prior set of measures). Tests of incremental 
validity are therefore very similar to tests of discriminant 
validity, and can be seen as a more specific aspect of this 
form of validity. What, then, would constitute an alterna-
tive model containing other constructs that could more 
parsimoniously explain voting preferences and social policy 
attitudes?
Personality has been shown to reliably predict political 
orientation (Carney et al. 2008). Likewise, the power of 
System Justification in explaining political conservatism 
and various intergroup attitudes has been extensively 
documented (Jost et al. 2003; Kay and Jost 2003). System 
Justification indexes an ideology akin to just world beliefs, 
prescribing that society is generally fair and that people get 
what they deserve. Combined with demographic indica-
tors, Big Five personality and System Justification ideology 
therefore seemed to provide reasonable alternative explana-
tions for social and political preferences. I therefore deemed 
it important to control for these constructs when evaluating 
the hypothesized unique effects of SPE and HRN on voting 
preferences and policy attitudes.
3.2. Ethnic Group Differences in SPE and HRN
I assert that a low level of SPE ideology emphasizing how 
much “we like them” or perhaps how much “we enjoy 
their culture” may combine with the negation of claims 
for reparation based on historical injustice (HRN) (“let 
bygones be bygones”) as a way of justifying the status 
quo. Ideologies promoting support for symbolic aspects 
of Indigenous culture may therefore operate to legitimize 
the existing system in a manner similar to how Benevolent 
Sexism is theorized to operate by both disarming women’s 
resistance to gender inequality and also allowing men to 
maintain a positive self-image as protectors and provid-
ers for their “better halves” (Glick and Fiske 1996). This 
should result in a pattern of relatively low SPE but high 
HRN across society as a whole. This might be summa-
rized as reflecting something like the following reasoning: 
“Indigenous culture is an important part of our nation, 
but the past is still the past, and although bad things hap-
pened to the Indigenous people, we, the majority, are not 
accountable.”
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If this reasoning is correct, then Māori and non-Māori 
New Zealanders should exhibit very similar levels of SPE 
(and generally be supportive of the symbolic projection 
of Māori culture). However, Māori and non-Māori New 
Zealanders should differ dramatically in the positioning 
of history, with non-Māori New Zealanders displaying 
higher levels of HRN than Māori. To test these predic-
tions, I examined mean differences in SPE and HRN 
across three different groups of NZ citizens: Māori, 
NZ-born non-Māori, and foreign-born citizens. I also 
controlled for other demographic variables (gender, age, 
income, marital and religious status) in these analyses in 
order to rule out the possibility that any mean differences 
might result from these alternative factors. I hypothesized 
that there would be an interaction in which Māori and 
NZ-born non-Māori citizens would be similar in SPE, but 
that NZ-born non-Māori citizens would exhibit signifi-
cantly higher HRN. I also predicted that foreign-born NZ 
citizens would exhibit high HRN, but did not have clear 
predictions about whether or not this group would display 
high or low levels of SPE.
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Participants and Procedure
Participants were 447 NZ citizens who were approached in 
public places (e.g., parks, bus stops, other outdoor seated 
areas). Participants (176 men, 271 women; Mage= 31.16 SDage 
= 14.06) were invited to complete the questionnaire on the 
spot or take it with them and post it back at a later date. 
Thirty-two percent of participants were married, and 44 
percent identified with a religion and/or congregation. Me-
dian reported household income was within the $NZ 71,000 
– $NZ 80,000 bracket.
Participants were offered a $5 grocery voucher as an 
incentive to participate. The measures analyzed here were 
included within a larger unrelated battery. Analyses of other 
aspects of these data, which also included non-NZ citizens, 
are reported in Sibley and Duckitt (2010).
I categorized participants into three groups: Māori (n = 58), 
other (non-Māori) NZ-born citizens (n = 240) and foreign-
born NZ citizens (n = 149). NZ-born citizens identified their 
ethnicity as follows: 190 New Zealand Europeans/Pakeha, 
36 Pacific Island New Zealanders, 6 Chinese New Zealand-
ers, 6 Indian New Zealanders, and 2 unreported. Foreign-
born citizens identified their country of origin as follows: 
29 United Kingdom, 17 other European nations, 16 South 
Africa, 12 China, 12 India, 12 Middle East, 10 Australia, 9 
other Asian nations, 8 Pacific Islands, 7 Canada/United 
States, 7 Philippines, 6 Korea, and 4 Sri Lanka.
3.3.2. Measures
The PCIS-2D was administered as in Study 1 (see Table 1 for 
items). System Justification was assessed using the eight-
item scale developed by Kay and Jost (2003). The System 
Justification scale contains items such as “Everyone has a 
fair shot at wealth and happiness in New Zealand” and “In 
general, I find New Zealand society to be fair.” All items 
were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) and averaged to give scale scores.
The Big Five dimensions of personality were assessed using 
items from the Big Five Aspects Scale (BFAS; DeYoung, 
Quilty, and Peterson 2007). The BFAS measures two distinct 
aspects of each Big Five dimension. Items were rated on a 
scale ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate). 
I averaged the items assessing each pair of Big Five aspects 
to create broad-bandwidth (twelve-item) indicators of each 
Big Five dimension (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Consci-
entiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience). 
Descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s alphas for all scales, and 
correlations between scale scores, are reported in Table 2. 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
I conducted a CFA testing the hypothesized dual-factor 
structure of the PCIS-2D. As shown in Figure 1, the eight 
items assessing each subscale were modeled as loading on 
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two distinct but correlated latent variables representing SPE 
and HRN. All items were strongly related to their hypothe-
sized latent factor, as shown by the standardized coefficients 
reported in Figure 1. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between all variables in Study 2 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14 15. 16.
11. Gender (.50 male, -.50 female)
12. Age .13*
13. Household income .09 .04
14. Marital status (.50 yes, -.50 no) .02 .49* .17*
15. Religious (.50 yes, -.50 no) -.04 .08 .08 .12*
16. SPE .19* -.07 -.01 -.07 -.11*
17. HRN .05 -.13* .09 -.04 -.04 .46*
18. Extraversion -.09 -.09 .06 -.00 .10* -.15* -.03
19. Agreeableness -.22 .12* .04 .13* .14* -.31* -.03 .22*
10. Conscientiousness -.02 .17* .12* .18* .10* -.03 .02 .17* .19*
11. Neuroticism -.12* -.22* -.09 -.19* -.04 .08 .06 -.14* -.10* -.15*
12. Openness to Experiences -.10* -.01 .02 -.02 -.09 -.26* -.10* .38* .26* .09 -.02
13. System Justification .12* .20* .14* .22* .13* -.11* -.01 .01 .01 .13* -.22* -.03
14. Support for National Party .08 -.07 .10* .05 .14* .23* .31* .09 .00 .16* -.07 -.05 .20*
15. Support for Labor Party -.07 -.06 -.06 -.08 -.06 -.24* -.27* .04 .02 -.03 .05 .11* .09 -.45*
16. Support for Govt. Funding Ma–ori TV -.13* -.04 .00 -.05 -.01 -.54* -.51* .09 .06 -.09* -.05 .18* -.02 -.22* .25*
	 M 2.79 4.39 4.81 5.16 4.69 3.74 4.96 4.38 4.37 4.48 4.11
	 SD 1.27 1.33 .79 .75 .80 .86 .77 .82 1.73 1.77 1.79
 α .90 .88 .78 .77 .75 .81 .70 .72
	 skewness .61 -.11 -.04 -.46 -.13 .14 -.14 -.18 -.31 -.27 -.18
	 kurtosis .03 -.03 -.12 1.14 .09 .16 .08 .20 -.76 -.83 -.83
n = 447, * p < .05.
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When evaluating model fit, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest 
that reasonable measurement models should generally have 
a standardized Root Mean Square Residual (sRMR) of near 
or below .08, values of around or above .95 for the Non-
Normed Fit Index (NNFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and a Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA) of near or below .06. Fit indices 
for the hypothesized model were: χ2(103) = 719.72, p < .01; 
sRMR = .065, NNFI = .94, CFI = .95, IFI = .95, RMSEA = .12. 
The hypothesized model performed reasonably well accord-
ing to most of these indices, indicating reasonable model fit. 
The exception was the RMSEA, which indicated that model 
fit was fairly poor according to this specific index. Critically, 
however, the sRMR was within acceptable bounds (less than 
.08), and the hypothesized dual-factor model depicted in 
Figure 1 also provided a substantially better fit than an alter-
Figure 1: CFA of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D) with standardized parameter estimates (items are listed in Table 1)
Symbolic Projection
vs. Exclusion (SPE)
Historical Recognition
vs. Negation (HRN)
SPE01.36
SPE02
SPE03
SPE04
SPE05
SPE06
SPE07
SPE08 
.40
.42
.29
.56
.40
.78
.36
.80*
.77*
.76*
.85*
.66*
.77*
.47*
.80*
HRN01.44
HRN02
HRN03
HRN04
HRN05
HRN06
HRN07
HRN08 
.64
.37
.63
.56
.62
.30
.62
.75*
.60*
.79*
.61*
.66*
.62*
.83*
.62*
1.00
.52*
1.00
* p	< .05.
117IJCV : Vol. 4 (1) 2010, pp. 106 – 123Chris G. Sibley: The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology
native model in which items assessing SPE and HRN loaded 
on a single latent variable (χ2d.ff(1) = 1633, p < .01).
3.4.2. Ideology Predicts Voting Preferences and Social Policy Attitudes
I conducted a series of hierarchical multiple regression 
analyses examining the extent to which a model containing 
HRN and SPE improved the variance explained in three 
outcomes, beyond that already explained by an initial set of 
other predictor variables. These other predictors, I argue, 
represent a plausible alternative model that explains indi-
vidual differences in voting preferences and social policy 
attitudes in terms of demographics (gender, age, income, 
religious affiliation, and marital status), Big Five personality 
(Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroti-
cism, and Openness to Experience), and the relatively uni-
versal ideology of System Justification. I first tested a model 
containing this set of initial predictors, and then a revised 
model also containing SPE and HRN, and their interaction. 
Results for the final regression models (containing all vari-
ables) predicting (a) support for the Labor Party, (b) support 
for The National Party, and (c) support for government 
funding of a dedicated free-to-air Māori television channel 
are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Multiple regression analyses examining the unique effects of Symbolic Projection vs. Exclusion (SPE) and Historical  Recognition 
vs. Negation (HRN) on support for the Labor Party, the National Party, and government funding of Ma–ori television in NZ
Support for the  
Labor Party
Support for the  
National Party
Support for government 
funding of Ma–ori TV
β t β t β t
Gender (.50 male, -.50 female) -.03 -.68 .04 .83 -.04 -1.09
Age -.06 -1.02 -.12 -2.27* -.07 -1.56
Household income -.03 -.66 .02 .46 .05 1.38
Marital status (.50 yes, -.50 no) -.07 -1.21 .05 .96 -.03 -.66
Religious (.50 yes, -.50 no) -.08 -1.71 .12 2.69* -.04 -1.10
Extraversion .01 .22 .08 1.59 .01 .26
Agreeableness -.02 -.41 .02 .38 -.07 -1.61
Conscientiousness -.01 -.23 .11 2.36* -.08 -2.08*
Neuroticism .06 1.25 -.04 -.83 -.05 -1.24
Openness to Experiences .05 .93 -.00 -.08 .05 1.14
System Justification .13 2.74* .18 3.84* -.04 -.98
SPE -.13 -2.18* .18 3.19* -.40 -8.21*
HRN -.22 -4.16* .21 4.14* -.33 -7.52*
SPE x HRN -.01 -.27 -.02 -.46 -.01 -.12
Note: The Labor Party is the primary center-left political party in NZ. The National Party is the primary center-right political party in NZ. Support for government funding of Ma–ori TV refers funding of 
a free-to-air Ma–ori television channel. SPE x HRN refers to the interaction term created by multiplying centered SPE and HRN scores. β = standardized beta coefficient, * p < .05.
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The initial model containing demographics, Big Five person-
ality and System Justification predicted 5 percent of the vari-
ance in individual differences in support for the Labor Party 
(R2 = .05, F(11,435) = 1.88, p = .04). This same model predicted 
10 percent of the variance in support for the National Party 
(R2 = .10, F(11,435) = 4.34, p < .01) and 6 percent of the vari-
ance in support for government funding of Māori television 
(R2 = .06, F(11,435) = 2.70, p < .01). Thus, in all three cases, the 
initial model explained a significant, but reasonably small 
percentage of variance (5–10 percent) in individual attitudes 
toward these three political and policy-related outcomes. 
A revised model also including SPE and HRN (and their in-
teraction) predicted a significant and substantial proportion 
of additional variance in all three outcomes beyond that ex-
plained by demographics, personality and System Justifica-
tion. The revised model containing SPE and HRN predicted 
an additional 8 percent of variance in support for the Labor 
Party, yielding a combined model explaining a total of 13 
percent of the variance (ΔR2 = .08, ΔF(2,433) = 20.37, p < .01; 
final model R2 = .13, F(13,433) = 4.87, p < .01). Likewise, the 
revised model predicted an additional 10 percent of vari-
ance in support for the National Party, yielding a combined 
model explaining a total of 20 percent of the variance (ΔR2 
= .10, ΔF(2,433) = 26.74, p < .01; final model R2 = .20, F(13,433) 
= 8.22, p < .01). The revised model containing SPE and HRN 
also predicted a whopping 34 percent additional variance 
in support for government funding of a free-to-air Māori 
television channel, yielding a combined model explain-
ing a total of 41 percent of the variance in attitudes toward 
this policy issue (ΔR2 = .34, ΔF(2,433) = 124.04, p < .01; final 
model R2 = .41, F(12,433) = 22.67, p < .01). 
These results clearly indicate that, when predicting all three 
outcomes, a model including SPE and HRN exhibited sub-
stantially greater predictive power than one based solely on 
demographics, personality, and System Justification ideology. 
Standardized betas and t-values for the final model assessing 
the unique effects of all predictor variables on support for 
the Labor Party, the National Party and government fund-
ing of a free-to-air Māori television channel are presented 
in Table 3. Higher SPE and HRN scores predicted increased 
support for the center-right National Party, and decreased 
levels of support for the center-left Labor Party and govern-
ment funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel. 
Critically in all three cases, SPE and HRN exerted unique 
main effects. This indicates that, despite being moderately-
to-strongly positively correlated, both ideologies provided 
unique explanatory power when predicting these three 
outcomes. The inclusion of HRN and SPE dramatically in-
creased the explanatory power of a model explaining politi-
cal and voting preferences in terms of individual differences. 
Moreover, the effects of these dual ideologies appear to be 
additive rather than interactive, as evidenced by the non-
significant SPE x HRN interaction terms in all three models. 
3.4.3. Ethnic Group Differences in SPE and HRN
To explore ethnic group differences in mean levels of SPE 
and HRN, I tested a three (citizen group: foreign-born NZ 
citizens, NZ-born non-Māori citizens, Māori) by two (ideol-
ogy: SPE versus HRN) interaction using a mixed-design 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. This 
interaction was significant (F(2,444) = 3.59, p = .03, partial 
η2 = .02), and persisted after controlling for demographic 
differences in gender, age, household income, and religious 
and marital status (F(2,439) = 3.83, p = .02, partial η2 = .02).
Figure 2: Adjusted mean levels of SPE and HRN in a 
 community sample of foreign-born, New Zealand-born 
non-Ma–ori, and Ma–ori New Zealand citizens 
Symbolic Projecton
versus Exclusion (SPE)
Historical Recognition
versus Negation (HRN)
High 7
6
5
4
3
2
Low 1
Foreign-Born Citizens
NZ-Born (Non-Ma–ori)
Ma–ori
Note Adjusted means represent intercepts after controlling for centered gender, marital status, 
and religion, and mean age and income. Error bars represent the standard errors of these 
intercepts). 
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Adjusted mean levels of SPE and HRN across the three citi-
zen groups (foreign-born NZ citizens, NZ-born non-Māori 
citizens, Māori) are presented in Figure 2. These adjusted 
means represent intercepts controlling for centered gender, 
marital status, and religion, and mean age and income. As 
shown, the interaction occurred because NZ-born non-
Māori citizens seemed similar to Māori in that both groups 
were reasonably low in SPE, but more similar to foreign-
born NZ citizens in that both groups were reasonably high 
in HRN. Additional analyses supported this interpretation, 
as the main effects for both SPE (F(2,439) = 24.34, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .04) and HRN (F(2,439) = 7.57, p < .01, partial η2 
= .03) across citizen groups were both significant (demo-
graphics were entered as covariates in all analyses). Impor-
tantly, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons indicat-
ed that, as hypothesized, NZ-born non-Māori citizens and 
Māori expressed similar (non-significantly different) levels 
of SPE (p = .13), and both groups expressed significantly 
lower levels of SPE compared to foreign-born NZ citizens 
(ps < .02). As expected, a different pattern emerged when 
examining mean levels of HRN. NZ-born non-Māori citi-
zens were extremely similar to foreign-born NZ citizens in 
this regard, and both displayed extremely similar levels of 
HRN (p = .99), and were both significantly higher in HRN 
than Māori (ps < .01).
4. Discussion 
Study 2 validated the PCIS-2D and tested novel predictions 
derived from the proposed dark duo model of post-colonial 
ideology using a large community sample. The study tested 
and found reasonable support for the proposed dual-factor 
structure of the PCIS-2D assessing SPE and HRN. In par-
ticular, this dual factor model provided a substantially bet-
ter fit than an alternative single-factor model. This provided 
additional evidence that, although positively correlated, 
the exclusion of Indigenous culture from representations of 
the national category and the negation of historical injus-
tices experienced by Indigenous peoples represent distinct 
ideologies. 
By definition, political ideology should shape political 
preferences, voting behavior, and social policy attitudes (see 
Jost 2006, for recent discussion). This, I argue, is a necessary 
but not sufficient criterion for defining political ideology. As 
such, tests of the ability of ideology to predict political party 
preferences provide an excellent test of construct validity 
when developing new measures of political ideology. Study 
2 indicated that SPE and HRN both predicted substantial 
unique (non-overlapping) variance in individual differences 
in three important political questions in NZ: support versus 
opposition for the two major NZ political parties (the Labor 
Party and the National Party), and support versus opposi-
tion on a topical social issue that generated much debate at 
the time these data were collected in 2008 and early 2009: 
government funding of a free-to-air Māori television chan-
nel. The findings provide good evidence for the convergent 
and discriminant validity of PCIS-2D and indicate that the 
scale provides important information that increases the ac-
curacy of models predicting voting behavior in NZ. Indeed, 
this is something of an understatement, as HRN and SPE 
together increased the predictive power of the baseline 
models by 8-10 percent when predicting political party sup-
port, and by 34 percent when predicting support for a Māori 
television channel.
Finally, analysis of mean differences across ethnic groups 
indicated that non-Māori NZ-born citizens and Māori were 
similar in their level of support for the symbolic representa-
tion of Māori culture in national identity (as evidenced by 
comparably low SPE scores). Non-Māori NZ-born citizens 
were readily distinguishable from Māori however, in that 
they maintained that historical injustices should be forgot-
ten or no longer viewed as relevant (as evidenced by signifi-
cantly higher HRN scores). 
5. General Discussion
As far as I am aware, this is the first psychological study to 
have attempted to identify and develop psychometric mea-
sures of the contemporary ideologies that result from the 
specific and unique socio-structural circumstances pres-
ent in many modern-day post-colonial nations. There is a 
plethora of literature documenting the ideologies that arose 
in colonial periods, in contrast. Colonial ideology centered 
on the notion of Indigenous peoples as “noble savages” who 
were childlike and in need of protection and civilization 
afforded by Europeans (see Jackman 1994, for an excellent 
review). As Glick and Fiske comment (2001), this colonial 
ideology of civilizing paternalism and protection “for their 
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own benefit”, was aptly characterized by the so-called 
prophet of British imperialism, Rudyard Kipling in the first 
verse of the poem, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899, 290):
Take up the White Man’s burden— 
Send forth the best ye breed— 
Go, bind your sons to exile 
To serve your captives’ need; 
To wait, in heavy harness, 
On fluttered folk and wild— 
Your new-caught sullen peoples, 
Half devil and half child.
Much as modern forms of racism have supplanted classical 
or old-fashioned racism (McConahay 1986), I argue that 
modern post-colonial ideology has supplanted ideologies 
of colonial imperialism such as that expressed in Kipling’s 
poem. 
I proposed and tested a Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial 
Ideology. The dark duo contains two related, but clearly dis-
tinct, ideologies: one reflecting Historical Recognition versus 
Negation (HRN), the other reflecting Symbolic Projection 
versus Exclusion (SPE). HRN indexes the prescriptive belief 
that historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples 
in the colonial era are irrelevant in contemporary society. 
SPE indexes the prescriptive belief that Indigenous culture 
is irrelevant in representations of modern national identity. 
Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis indicated the 
Post-Colonial Ideology Scale – 2 Dimensions (PCIS-2D) 
provided a valid and internally reliable measure of these 
two ideologies in the New Zealand context. 
The SPE and HRN scales evidenced a strong and unique 
ability to predict political party support in a community 
sample of NZ voters (Study 2). These effects persisted after 
controlling for a host of other predictors of political party 
support, including demographic factors such as age and 
income, broad-bandwidth indicators of Big Five personal-
ity, and the general ideology of System Justification. That 
these effects persisted after controlling for System Justi-
fication is particularly promising, given that this latter 
ideology has been shown to have strong and pervasive 
effects on intergroup and political attitudes across numer-
ous domains (see Kay et al. 2007, for a review). SPE and 
HRN index something unique in this regard, although 
the belief that the political system is fair and operates as it 
should (system justification) is also a good general predic-
tor of political preferences. It seems that the positioning 
of historical injustice as irrelevant, and of Indigenous 
symbols as being something that is irrelevant for modern 
conceptions of the national category, provide an axis of 
meaning that aids in the creation and mobilization of 
political opinion.
5.1. Implications, Caveats, and Directions for Future Research
The identification of SPE and HRN as distinct ideologies 
that predict voting and policy preferences raises intriguing 
questions about the role and function of realistic/resource-
based versus symbolic representations of Indigenous culture 
in national identity. For instance, the Ingroup Projection 
Model and the Common Ingroup Identity Model both state 
that creating a superordinate representation that includes 
both subgroups should serve to increase tolerance and 
decrease discrimination (see Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 
2009, for a review). The Common Ingroup Identity Model 
also emphasizes that interventions aiming to create a super-
ordinate categorization can have the reverse effect because 
they may threaten positive distinctiveness of the constitu-
ent groups. In their review, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 
(2009) emphasize the importance of mutual intergroup 
differentiation, which proposes that to be effective, the 
superordinate representation should recognize and equally 
emphasize both subgroup identities (see also Hornsey and 
Hogg 2000). 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model has important impli-
cations for social policy aiming to promote a more inclusive 
national identity. Although social policies that emphasize 
symbolic integration and equality of identity contribution 
might strengthen a mutual ingroup national identity, it 
seems less likely that they will affect support for material al-
locations or representations relating to the guardianship of 
resources. As my colleagues and I propose (Sibley, Liu, and 
Khan in press), it would be interesting to compare manipu-
lations that emphasize mutual intergroup identity in terms 
of representations of belongingness (which seems to be 
already in place or at least easily accessible in NZ) with ma-
nipulations that emphasize shared responsibility for looking 
after and protecting material resources, such as NZ national 
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assets, forests, fisheries, and the natural environment. These 
latter interventions might help to further change public 
opinion about material allocations aiming to promote social 
equality and address historical injustices experienced by 
Māori. 
There are numerous avenues for future research extending 
the model of post-colonial ideology that I propose here. One 
obvious next step is to ensure that the model holds in post-
colonial nations other than NZ. As I argue above, I expect 
that the model should predict political party preferences 
in all post-colonial nations where “former colonizers” live 
side by side with “former colonized” peoples, and where 
the following conditions are also met: (a) there is a history 
of objective historical injustice experienced by Indigenous 
peoples, and those peoples have a voice to call modern day 
society to account, and (b) Indigenous peoples have undeni-
able nationality and a collective voice calling for cultural 
representation and recognition. 
Future research could, for instance, test whether the mean 
levels of SPE and HRN expressed by non-Indigenous citi-
zens vary systematically according to objective indicators 
of material inequality experienced by different Indigenous 
groups. For instance, in the NZ context the Treaty of Wait-
angi (signed between the British Crown and Māori in 1840) 
provides a legal basis for claims for reparation under com-
mon law. NZ seems fairly unique in this context. I suspect 
that HRN may become more salient in this context, because 
there is a strong legal basis for claims for reparation. In na-
tions with less legal basis for claims for reparation, endors-
ing HRN may be less pertinent in legitimating continued 
levels of inequality. Thus, HRN may, for example, be lower 
among Australian Europeans than among NZ Europeans, 
as Australia does not have a similar treaty between the Brit-
ish Crown and Indigenous Australian peoples. 
Another obvious direction for future research is to extend 
the PCIS-2D to incorporate other dimensions of ideol-
ogy not limited to the unique socio-structural conditions 
present in post-colonial nations. SPE and HRN form two 
central ideologies in post-colonial society, but this is not to 
say that other ideologies do not also play an important part. 
Obvious candidates for a unified and comprehensive model 
of the dimensions of ethnic-group ideology include Sys-
tem Justification Ideology (Kay and Jost 2003) and Color-
Blind Ideology (Knowles et al. 2009). These two ideologies 
have been identified in general research on ethnic group 
relations, and should also be relevant for understanding 
intergroup relations between Indigenous and more recent 
settler/immigrant populations in post-colonial society. 
5.2. Concluding Comments and Reflections
I began this manuscript with a quote from the Hunn Report 
commissioned by the New Zealand government in 1961. The 
Hunn Report talked about integration of Māori culture in 
terms of “the chief relics” being those “worthiest of preser-
vation.” This epigraph reflects an ideology relating to beliefs 
about the projection and maintenance of symbolic aspects 
of Māori culture, and the manner in which those aspects 
are positioned, which I have tried to articulate and develop 
a reliable measure of here. I refer to this scale as a mea-
sure of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). My 
analysis paints a dark view of integration; and suggests that 
Māori culture and practices may be strategically positioned 
as distinct from national identity, or as not belonging in 
representations of the superordinate or national category. 
What is key to this analysis is that SPE reflects a prescriptive 
belief that positions Māori cultural elements and symbols 
as being maladaptive, or a thing of the past that is of little 
relevance for contemporary national identity, as opposed to 
an important and integral part of New Zealand. 
The ideology of symbolic exclusion does not operate in 
isolation. I argue that it forms one part of a dual ideological 
system, which when paired with an ideology of Historical 
Recognition versus Negation (HRN), functions in tandem to 
legitimize systemic inequality in the allocation of resources 
and the cultural representation of Indigenous versus more 
recent settler/immigrant populations. Together, these 
two ideologies form a “dark duo”; they articulate a pair of 
discourses that draw upon culturally sanctioned repertoires 
to “make ok” or dismiss calls for reparation and representa-
tion. This interpretation is grounded in Social Dominance 
Theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and Integrated Threat 
Theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Integrated Threat 
Theory emphasizes a distinction between symbolic and re-
alistic or material threats, which parallels the more specific 
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distinction between SPE and HRN which I present here. 
Social Dominance Theory locates these dual ideologies as 
two central or proximal legitimizing myths operating in 
post-colonial nations to justify different aspects of inequal-
ity in intergroup relations between immigrant/settler and 
Indigenous populations. 
I wish to finish on a personal note. When reading political 
speeches and elite discourse used to develop items for the 
PCIS-2D, I was struck by the lack of alternative formula-
tions available. This is evident in the way the pro-trait items 
included in the PCIS-2D in many cases closely mirror ac-
tual political discourse, whereas I wrote the reverse-worded 
items in response to such discourse because alternative 
counter-formulations were few and far between in the avail-
able media and political discourse. There is a very real need 
to provide alternative ideological positions. This is difficult; 
however, it is by no means impossible. Indeed, there are 
some powerful and evocative exceptions to the dominant 
ideological position; one of these, in a speech made by New 
Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk shortly before his 
untimely death in 1974, I will end with here:
We are not one people; we are one nation. The idea of one 
people grew out of the days when fashionable folk talked about 
integration. So far as the majority and minority are concerned, 
integration is precisely what cats do to mice. They integrate 
them. The majority swallows up the minority; makes it sacrifice 
its culture and traditions and often its belongings to conform 
to the traditions and the culture of the majority. . . . We are one 
nation in which all have equal rights, but we are two peoples 
and in no circumstances should we by any law or Act demand 
that any part of the New Zealand community should have to 
give up its inheritance, its culture, or its identity to play its part 
in this nation. 
(Norman Kirk, 5 July 1974)
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